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National climate policies are shaped by international organizations (IOs) and global 
norms. Drawing from World Society Theory and the Advocacy Coalition Framework, we 
develop two related arguments: (1) one way in which IOs can influence national climate 
policy is through their engagement in mass-mediated national policy debates and (2) na-
tional organizations involved in the policy process may form advocacy coalitions to sup-
port or oppose the norms promoted by IOs. To examine the role of IOs in national policy 
debates and the coalitions that support and oppose them, we use discourse network anal-
ysis on over 3500 statements in eleven newspapers in Canada, United States, Brazil and 
India. We find that in the high-income countries where greenhouse gas emissions are high 
(Canada and the US), IOs are less central in the policy debates and the discourse network 
is strongly clustered into competing advocacy coalitions. In the low emitting countries 
(Brazil and India) IOs are more central and the discourse network is less clustered. Relat-
ing these findings to earlier research leads us to suggest that the differences we find be-
tween high and low emitting countries may be to some extent generalizable to these coun-
try groups beyond our four cases. 
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1. Introduction 
National climate policies are shaped by international organizations (IOs) and treaties, and 
the policy norms they promote (Meyer et al., 1997; Schofer & Hironaka, 2005; Hironaka, 
2014). These include treaties such as The United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC), intergovernmental organizations such as Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and transnational NGOs such as Greenpeace. The 
norms they promote include the scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change, 
principles such as that of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and the ob-
ligation to define national emission reduction targets and submit them to the United Na-
tions. 
However, countries differ substantially in how they have embraced climate policy 
norms promoted by IOs. While much research has looked into climate change politics in 
the international arena (e.g. Roberts & Parks, 2007; Roberts, 2011; Stoett, 2012), less 
comparative work has been done to understand national differences in climate change 
policymaking (Purdon, 2015) and the role of IOs in different political economic-contexts. 
One way in which IOs can influence national policymaking is by engaging in 
public policy debates taking place in different countries. IOs publish reports such as the 
IPCCC assessment reports, organize public events such as the UN COP conferences that 
become global media events and issue recommendations for national governments. These 
reports, events and recommendations are often followed by approval or resistance by na-
tional level organizations active in the climate policy debate, resulting in political disputes 
in arenas such as the national mass media over the arguments of IOs.  
In this paper, we are interested in two questions: (a) how central are IOs in mass-
mediated national policy debates on climate change in different countries, and (b) what 
kinds of advocacy coalitions support and oppose the global norms promoted by IOs? Our 
method, discourse network analysis, enables us to analyze these debates from a network 
perspective, to assess how central IOs are in the different countries’ policy debates in 
mass media and what kinds of coalitions of actors agree or oppose them. 
Our theoretical framework combines the idea of domestication of global norms 
developed in the world society literature on the one hand, and the advocacy coalition 
framework (hereafter ACF) on the other. The world society literature directs our attention 
to the role of IOs in national policy processes, and the concept of domestication highlights 
that various organizations at the national level may seek to ally with or oppose IOs and 
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the norms they promote (Qadir & Alasuutari, 2014; Alasuutari, 2016). The advocacy co-
alition framework offers systematic tools to analyze these alliances and resistance, by 
focusing on how organizations group into coalitions based on shared value priorities and 
policy preferences (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1988; 1999).  
Our empirical material consists of more than 3500 statements in the most widely 
read newspapers in Canada, the United States, Brazil and India. In terms of absolute coun-
try-level emissions these countries are all major emitters due to their sheer size, and con-
sequently, important actors in global climate change politics. In terms of per capita emis-
sions, however, the countries form two distinct groups. According to the latest World 
Bank data (2014), India’s emissions per capita are a mere 1.7 tons, closely followed by 
Brazil at 2.6 tons. Canada (15.1 tons per capita) and the US (16.5 tons per capita), in 
contrast, are among the world’s highest emitter in per capita terms. Per capita emissions 
are closely linked with per capita income levels, middle income India and Brazil emitting 
considerably less than high income Canada and US. Thus, this set of four countries ena-
bles us to compare differences in national policy debates between high and middle income 
countries. This is relevant for two reasons. First, existing research has shown that IOs 
tend to play stronger roles in policy processes in lower income countries than in high 
income ones (Frank et al., 2007; Longhofer and Schofer, 2010). Second, the global norms 
concerning these two sets of countries are different: more cuts are required from high-
income countries (Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol) than lower income ones 
(non-Annex I countries). This may contribute to differences between the two country 
groups in the levels of resistance faced by IOs. 
We find that IOs are less central in the debates in the high-emitting, high-income 
countries (the US and Canada), where they are embedded in a conflictual discourse net-
work which is strongly clustered into competing advocacy coalitions supporting or op-
posing global norms. In the low-emitting lower income countries (Brazil and India), IOs 
are more central and the discourse networks much less conflictual, showing less opposi-
tion to global norms on climate change. 
 
2. Analytical Framework & Research Questions 
Our analytical framework combines the world society literature on the domestica-
tion of global norms with the Advocacy Coalition Framework literature. The world soci-
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ety literature directs our attention to the role of international organizations (IOs) in na-
tional policy debates, and points out that domestic actors may contest or defend the norms 
promoted by IOs. The ACF literature provides us with tools to analyze how the domestic 
organizations that contest and defend the norms promoted by IOs group into coalitions – 
something that the world society literature has not looked into. Thus, the two theoretical 
literatures, combined into a single analytical framework, enable us to draw a picture of 
the role of IOs and their supporters and opponents in national policy debates that neither 
theory in itself could not do. 
The world society literature has shown that IOs are important drivers of environ-
mental policymaking, including climate change policy, at the national level. The literature 
has analyzed environmentalism as a set of global cultural norms, embedded in in a global 
environmental regime comprising interstate institutions and treaties, institutionalized en-
vironmental sciences and international CSOs (Meyer et al., 1997; Schofer & Hironaka, 
2005; Hironaka, 2014). The extent to which a country adheres to these norms is affected 
by its degree of integration in the world society: the more the international treaties a coun-
try participates in and the more international non-governmental organizations are present, 
for instance, the more likely a country is to enact ambitious environmental policies (Scho-
fer and Hironaka, 2005). 
In this paper, we argue that one way in which IOs can influence national policy-
making is through their role in policy debates in national mass media. Research on media 
coverage of climate change has shown that this is particularly true of the climate change 
debate, where the publication of the IPCC 4th assessment report in 2007 and the UN COP 
15 conference in 2009 have been important drivers of public debate across the world 
(Schäfer et al., 2014). This observation leads us to ask: 
 
RQ1: How central are IOs in mass mediated national climate policy debates in 
different countries? 
 
While the world society literature has demonstrated that countries indeed do follow 
global cultural norms and implement global organizational models, it has rarely paid at-
tention to how global norms are often subject to heated debates, where national organi-
zations defend and others oppose these norms. Noting this gap, Qadir and Alasuutari 
(2014) have suggested that more research should pay attention to what they term domes-
tication of global norms. The idea is that global policy norms do not simply diffuse, but 
  
5 
that national political actors have a paramount role in the process as the global ideas are 
“made part of national political discourses and practices” (Alasuutari 2016, p. 21). When 
a global policy problem becomes a salient issue for national policy makers, domestic 
organizations start competing over the framing of it in political arenas, including the mass 
media (Alasuutari, 2016). While this focus on framing has produced interesting insights 
into how global norms enter national contexts, we add to the domestication perspective 
by drawing on the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 
1998; Jenkins Smith et al., 2014). The ACF argues that organizations aiming to influence 
policymaking in a particular policy domain form competing advocacy coalitions based 
on shared policy core beliefs. These include value priorities, the elemental causes and the 
preferred solutions for addressing the policy problem (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). 
A limitation of the ACF literature has long been that the framework has been mostly 
applied to policy processes at the national or sub-national level. Cross-country compara-
tive applications of the framework have been rare (see, however, Ingold et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, ACF studies focusing on national policy subsystems do not usually 
acknowledge the role of IOs as part of advocacy coalitions (two exceptions are Litfin, 
2000 and Sewell, 2005). The ACF should, in general, pay more attention to the external 
context of policy subsystems (Henry at al., 2014). 
Thus, we contribute to the world society literature on the domestication of global 
norms by looking into the role of advocacy coalitions in the domestication process, and 
to the ACF by engaging in a comparative study on the role of IOs in advocacy coalitions. 
We argue that the relative strength of coalitions that defend and oppose global policy 
norms are an important factor determining what kind of national policy response does the 
domestication process lead to. Thus, our second research question is: 
 
RQ2: What kind of advocacy coalitions defend the global norms on climate 
change in the mass-mediated policy debates in different countries, and what kind 
of coalitions oppose these norms? 
It is worth noting that this paper focusses on actors – the positions of IOs and na-
tional organizations in the discourse networks. Therefore, less attention is paid to the 
content of the claims they make. In table 3 in the material and methods section below we 
do present the most contentious and consensual issues debated in each country, but this 
is mostly to make transparent our coding scheme and the set of claims our network anal-
ysis is built on. In the analysis section we discuss the content of the claims only to the 
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extent that it is necessary for understanding how actors group into coalitions in the dis-
course network. Why certain issues become the foci of contestation or consensus in each 
country, need to be addressed in future studies. 
 
3. Case Selection, Materials and Methods 
We compare public climate policy debates in four countries: Canada, United States, 
Brazil and India. The first two are high-income countries with high per capita emissions, 
and their administrative, political and economic institutions have been developed and 
consolidated over long periods. In these countries, attempts to bring about more ambitious 
climate policies and the related global norms have faced resistance (Macdonald, 2008; 
Rabe, 2010), even taking the form of climate denialism, advocated by an organized cli-
mate change counter movement (McCright & Dunlap, 2003; Farrel, 2015). Brazil and 
India belong to the so-called BASIC countries that are increasingly influential in global 
politics of climate change (Hallding et al., 2013). As large countries, they are both major 
emitters, but emissions per capita are low. Both countries are strongly committed to the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) (Lahsen, 2004; Dubash, 
2009). CBDR is the main moral principle inscribed in the Kyoto Protocol, stating that 
while all countries share a common responsibility to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, 
high-income countries carry the major burden of emission reductions (Honkonen, 2009). 
In Brazil and India, there has also been little questioning of the scientific consensus on 
anthropogenic climate change (Painter & Ashe, 2012). 
Our data consists of newspaper articles from the years 2007 and 2008, the most in-
tense period of climate change debate in all four countries to date. During this period, in-
ternational organizations were exceptionally active on climate change, yielding much de-
bate and news material for our investigation. In 2007, the Inter-Governmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) released its 4th Assessment Report and received the Nobel Peace 
Prize jointly with Al Gore. Media coverage of climate change increased globally, peaking 
during the 15th Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen in 2009 (Schmidt et al., 2013; 
Broadbent et al., 2016). Domestic climate legislation also progressed in all four countries. 
The US Congress discussed a federal cap and trade system (Rabe, 2010). Canada debated 
a federal carbon tax after its British Columbia province introduced its own carbon tax in 
2008 (Sodero, 2011). Brazil introduced its voluntary climate plan in 2008 (Viola, 2013) 
while the Brazilian business sector and some Amazon-based politicians started to demand 
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more ambitious national commitments (Hochstetler & Viola, 2012). India’s civil society 
started actively engaging in climate change activities (Ylä-Anttila & Swarnakar, 2017) 
and India established a Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change in 2007 (PMCCC). 
Intense political debate on climate change thus marked these countries during this key 
period (Broadbent et al., 2016).  
Our empirical data consists of articles from eleven newspapers (Table 1) selected for 
their prominence (high circulation) and political diversity, ideally representing different 
ends of the politics spectrum in each country. Thus, they can be expected to represent the 
climate policy debate without excessive political bias.  
 
Table 1. Newspapers used in data collection in each country: 
The US: The Wall Street Journal, USA Today and The New York Times 
Canada: National Post, The Globe and Mail 
Brazil: Folha de São Paulo, O Estado de São Paulo, Valor Econômico 
India: The Times of India, The Hindu, The Indian Express 
 
 
This study is part of the international COMPON research project covering 20 countries. 
Our data collection and coding follow the common research protocol of the project. We 
used the Factiva database to retrieve all articles during the chosen time period that in-
cluded the terms “global warming” or “climate change”. We then manually removed 
those articles that did not primarily deal with climate politics or anthropogenic climate 
change. For final coding, we took a random sample of all articles, the sampling protocol 
allowing some variation according to resources of the different national teams. The total 
number of articles coded was 522 of 2,996 in Brazil; 603 of 3,015 in Canada; 283 of 1,206 
in India and 648 of 1,221 in United States.   
We use discourse network analysis (Leifeld, 2010) to discover which actors en-
gage in climate policy debates in the media, and how do they group into advocacy coali-
tions based on these beliefs. A growing number of studies argues that discourse coalitions 
in the public sphere have a crucial impact on policy processes (e.g. Bulkeley, 2000; 
Leifeld & Haunss, 2012; Rennkamp et al., 2017). As the media is a significant arena for 
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the politics and framing of climate change (Boykoff, 2011), ACF scholars have increas-
ingly used media material to trace policy advocacy coalitions (e.g. Leifeld, 2013; Lodge 
& Matus, 2014; Kukkonen et al., 2017). 
 The unit of analysis in DNA is a statement (Leifeld, 2010). We coded direct statements 
from organizations and statements being paraphrased by the journalist. Three different 
attributes were coded for each statement: 1) the organization making the statement, 2) 
the belief category, derived inductively from the data, into which the statement falls, and 
representing a policy core belief in the ACF, and 3) agreement or disagreement with the 
belief category. 
Table 2. Number of articles, statements, organizations and belief categories in each coun-
try. 
 
 Articles Statements Organizations Belief categories Reduced 
belief  
categories 
USA 648 1410 333 28 28 
CAN 603 1202 278 269 49 
BRA 522 639 192 69 50 
IND 283 472 167 83 43 
 
 
As table 2 shows, the amount of media coverage of climate change varies between 
the countries, as does the number of statements from organizations within the articles. 
The number of coded belief categories also varies. This is because the coding protocol 
allowed country teams to inductively draw the categories from their material, and some 
opted to use a more detailed list of codes than others. To make the categories comparable 
across countries, we combined categories in those countries where there were many. For 
example in Canada, the 6 categories “climate science is settled”, “CC is caused by hu-
mans”, “claims concerning CC are not exaggerated”, “GCC is real”, “greenhouse gases 
cause global warming” and “IPCC predictions are overly conservative” were combined 
into the single category “scientific claims that greenhouse gases contribute to climate 
change are valid.” 
From the final list of belief categories, we selected the three most debated conten-
tious beliefs and the three most debated consensual beliefs (Table 3). In each country, 
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these six belief categories subsumed approximately 60 percent of all statements, suggest-
ing that they adequately represent the main foci of media debate in each country. We used 
the contentious beliefs to discern competing advocacy coalitions and all the six beliefs to 
analyze the centrality of IOs in the overall debate.  
 
Table 3. Most contentious and consensual beliefs in each country during 2007-08, 
agree/disagree (%). 
 
 
Contention 
 
Consensus 
 
 
Canada 
Scientific claims that GHG contribute 
to climate change are valid,  48/52 
N=83 
Global warming causes negative environ-
mental impacts, 91/9 
N=117 
Addressing climate change is harmful 
for the economy, 46/54 
N=100 
Carbon tax is an appropriate way for Can-
ada to reduce emissions, 82/18 
N=65 
Canada should start reducing emis-
sions regardless of what developing 
countries do, 40/60 
N=57 
Federal government is taking meaningful 
action on climate change, 24/76 
N=159 
 
 
USA 
Scientific claims that GHG contribute 
to climate change are valid, 58/42 
N=106 
Cap and trade is the legislative approach the 
US should take in addressing climate 
change, 80/20 
N=315 
Regulating emissions to protect the 
environment is more important than 
protecting the economy, 37/63 
N=97 
Increasing alternative energy is the ap-
proach the US should take in addressing cli-
mate change, 89/11 
N=71 
Industry should be regulated in the 
US to decrease GHG emissions that 
contribute to climate change, 37/63 
N=67 
Higher auto efficiency standards are neces-
sary in the US to reduce GHG emissions 
that cause climate change, 73/27 
N=111 
 
 
Brazil 
Biofuels are an appropriate way to 
mitigate global warming, 57/43 
N=134 
Brazil should reduce its deforestation to 
achieve emission reductions, 93/7 
N=30 
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Current Brazilian actions to reduce 
climate change are strong and suffi-
cient, 35/65 
N=79 
Avoided deforestation should be achieved 
through a financial compensatory mecha-
nism, 85/15 
N=54 
Nuclear energy is viable and desirable 
alternative to fossil fuels, 46/54 
N=37 
Developed and developing countries 
should have different responsibilities in the 
climate regime, 70/30 
N=64 
 
India 
Responsibility of climate change is 
common but differentiated, 68/32 
N=69 
Alternative energy is a solution to climate 
change, 100/0 
N=33 
 Environmental change is evidence for cli-
mate change, 96/4 
N=137 
Climate change is real and caused anthro-
pogenically, 95/5 
N=41 
 
 
 We used the Visone software to (a) analyze the degree centrality of IOs in 
the discourse network, (b) create visual representations of the data and c) to analyze the 
clustering of the networks into competing advocacy coalitions using the Louvain method 
of community detection. The Louvain method gives a modularity score which is in the 
range of [-0.5,1]. Generally, values 0.4 are interpreted to mean that meaningful subgroups 
exist in a network (Blondel et al., 2008). 
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4. Results  
We begin by looking at the centrality of IOs in the four national policy debates 
(RQ1). We do this by analyzing the degree centrality (%) of international non-govern-
mental and intergovernmental organizations in the discourse network. The higher the de-
gree centrality of an actor, the more ties it has to other actors in the discourse network. In 
other words, the more statements an actor makes that attract agreement from other actors 
in the network, the more central the actor becomes. We find that IOs are not central actors 
in the policy debate in Canada and the US (Table 4). In both countries, the most central 
actors are national ones, especially political parties and states/provinces. While universi-
ties, national NGOs and foreign governments are more central in the Canadian case, en-
ergy companies are more central in the US. The only IO in the top 15 list in either country 
is the IPCC.   
 
Table 4. Degree centrality (%) of top 15 organizations in the US and Canadian discourse 
network. 
US Degree  
(%) 
Canada Degree 
 (%) 
    
Democratic Party 17.052 Liberal Party 7.991 
Republican Party  12.086 Pembina Institute 3.981 
California 6.898 Canadian Government 3.294 
Independent Party 3.026 Simon Frasier University 3.204 
Supreme Court 2.512 NDP 3.166 
US Government 2.506 University of Toronto 2.636 
Duke Energy Corp. 2.395 David Suzuki Foundation 2.401 
DuPont 2.385 University of Victoria 2.348 
New York 2.215 NASA 2.155 
General Electric 2.120 British Columbia 2.095 
New Jersey 1.594 IPCC 1.624 
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Connecticut 1.524 Australia 1.480 
IPCC 1.474 Natural Resources Canada 1.374 
Massachusetts 1.380 Green Party 1.355 
Vermont 1.335 US  1.349 
 
In Brazil and India, IOs occupy much more central positions in the discourse net-
works. The lists of the top 15 most central organizations include four IOs in both countries 
(Table 5). In Brazil, the UN is the fourth most central of all organizations involved in the 
debate, followed by Greenpeace (8th), the IPCC (10th) and WWF International (11th). In 
India, the IPCC is the most central organization, followed by the UN (3rd), Greenpeace 
(8th) and the World Bank (14th). The high degree of international influence on the debate 
in India is also visible in the fact that foreign governments are highly central: the UK is 
4th, China 10th and US 11th. Universities are central domestic actors in both countries. 
Government actors are more central in Brazil, while states are more central in India. 
 
Table 5. Degree centrality (%) of top 15 organizations in the Brazilian and Indian dis-
course network. 
Brazil Degree 
(%) 
India Degree 
(%) 
    
President of Brazil 14.458 IPCC 12.182 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 10.734 Government of India 9.484 
Ministry of the Environment 8.911 United Nations 5.803 
United Nations 5.239 Tamilnadu 3.934 
Brazilian Forum on Climate 
Change 
3.595 UK 3.094 
University of Rio de Janeiro 3.441 TERI 2.899 
Former Brazilian Minister of Agri-
culture 
3.082 Indian Institute of Science 2.862 
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National Institute for Space Re-
search 
2.851 Greenpeace India 2.123 
Greenpeace Brazil 2.851 Himachal Pradesh 2.086 
Brazilian Government 2.465 Exnora International 1.653 
IPCC 2.414 China 1.526 
WWF International  2.029 US 1.341 
Amazon Environmental Research 
Institute 
1.977 Indian Meteorological Depart-
ment 
1.310 
University of Sao Paolo 1.644 World Bank 1.288 
UNICA 1.644 University of Agricultural 
Sciences 
1.288 
 
 
Turning to our second research question, we analyze the formation of competing advo-
cacy coalitions that variously defend or oppose global norms promoted by IOs. We do 
this by looking at the co-occurrence of organizations in the discourse network based on 
the three contentious beliefs. There is a tie between actors if they both co-occur in the 
same belief category, i.e. they both agree or both disagree on the same belief. We find 
that in Canada and the US, where IOs were less central, the discourse network is more 
strongly clustered into competing coalitions, some defending and others opposing the 
norms promoted by these organizations. In Brazil and India where IOs were more central, 
such resistance is mostly absent. 
In Canada, the Louvain modularity score measuring the clustering of the network is 
0.422, and in the US 0.492. Both are well above the threshold of 0.4 that is usually inter-
preted as indicating a meaningful degree of clustering in a network (Blondel et al., 2008). 
We found three competing coalitions in the US and five in Canada. In the US, thy are: 1) 
the economy and skeptic coalition that believes economic growth is more important than 
environmental protection, opposes industrial regulation and believes that climate science 
is not valid, 2) the environment coalition that believes that environmental protection is 
more important than economic growth and that industry should be regulated, and 3) the 
science coalition that believes in the validity of climate science. In Canada, the coalitions 
are 1) the economy coalition that believes addressing climate change is harmful for the 
economy, 2) the environment coalition that does not believe that addressing climate 
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change will harm the economy, 3) the skeptic and anti-CBDR Coalition that believes that 
scientific claims about man-made climate change are not valid and opposes the CBDR, 
4) the science coalition that believes in the validity of scientific claims, and 5) the CBDR 
coalition that supports the CBDR. 
 
Figure 1. Actor co-occurrence network based on three most contentious beliefs in the 
Canadian news media during 2007-08, threshold more than one statement. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Actor co-occurrence network based on three most contentious beliefs in the US 
news media during 2007-08, threshold more than one statement. 
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In both countries, the coalitions that oppose the global norms consist mainly of national 
organizations. In the US, they include organizations from the counter movement but also 
business lobby groups, national industry associations, individual companies from the en-
ergy and business sector, and the Republican Party. Consistent with earlier research of 
US climate politics (Fisher et al., 2013; Painter & Ashe, 2012), the US debate is more 
ideologically charged than in any of the other three countries, reflected in discourses op-
posing climate legislation by invoking human nature and limited role for government. In 
Canada, the organizations opposing global norms based on economic arguments include 
the same types of actors. However, there is less of an organized counter-movement and 
open denial of climate science than in the US. 
 IOs belong to coalitions that defend the global norms. In both countries, organiza-
tions such as the IPCC belong to Science Coalition which defends the scientific consensus 
of anthropogenic climate change. Others such as the International Energy Agency (IEA), 
World Bank, Greenpeace (in Canada) and Oxfam (in the US) belong to the environment 
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coalition that argues for the need to reduce emissions and protect the environment. Alig-
ning with these IOs, in both countries, are national NGOs, individual corporations, uni-
versities and opposition political parties (Democratic Party in the US, and NDP, Liberal 
Party and the Green Party in Canada). In the US, some states are also visible actors in the 
environment coalition.  
 
Figure 3. Actor co-occurrence network based on three most contentious beliefs in the 
Brazilian news media during 2007-08, threshold more than one statement. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Actor co-occurrence network based on the one contentious belief in the Indian 
news media during 2007-08, threshold more than one statement. 
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In Brazil and India, where IOs are much more central, there is also much less re-
sistance towards the global norms they promote. The discourse networks are less clus-
tered than in Canada and the US. The Louvain modularity score for Brazil is 0.318 and 
for India 0.199. Both of these are below the threshold of 0.4, meaning that no clear coa-
litions are found in the network and the debate is less polarized than in Canada and the 
US.  In Brazil, conflicts are mainly about preferred policy instruments for tackling climate 
change and the adequacy of Brazilian actions. Much of the debate concerns biofuels. Do-
mestic organizations such as Brazilian government actors, industry associations, research 
institutes and corporations defend Brazilian biofuels as a positive mitigation option, with 
dissenting perspectives expressed mainly by international actors. The desirability of nu-
clear energy, by contrast, is subject to more dissent among domestic organizations such 
as research institutes, the Ministry for Environment and national NGOs. IOs such as the 
EU, the UN, WWF and Greenpeace oppose the use of these instruments, raising concerns 
over their possible detrimental environmental and social consequences. This debate, how-
ever, is not polarized enough to generate coalitions like those present in the Canadian and 
US debates. In India, national discussions are only divisive in terms of the CBDR. Do-
mestic actors align to support the CBDR, joined by IOs such as the UN and the IPCC. 
The few organizations opposing CBDR include some foreign Annex 1- governments and 
NGOs.  
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Discussion & Conclusions 
We developed an analytical framework synthesizing domestication theory and ACF to 
analyze the centrality of international organizations (IOs) and the opposition or support 
that they face from coalitions of national organizations in mass-mediated climate policy 
debates in Canada, the US, Brazil and India. We found that IOs are less central in the high 
emitting, high-income countries, Canada and the US, where the discourse network is 
strongly clustered into competing coalitions that variously defend and oppose global 
norms. In the low emitting countries, Brazil and India, the pattern is reverse: the higher 
centrality of IOs is accompanied with less clustering of the discourse network and less 
resistance to global norms. 
 In conclusion, we address two interrelated questions: (1) how do these findings re-
late to earlier literature on world society and IOs, and (2) to what extent are they gener-
alizable to countries beyond the four that we have studied here? 
 First, we found that resistance to IOs is low in the countries where they are more 
central and vice versa. The finding that IOs are more central in lower income countries 
of the Southern hemisphere is consistent with earlier literature on the world society and 
IOs. World society scholars have demonstrated that IOs and global cultural norms tend 
to have stronger effects on low-income than on high-income countries (Frank et al., 2007; 
Longhofer and Schofer, 2010). Other scholars looking at the role of IOs in developing 
countries have pointed out that the interpenetration of IOs has a long and strong history 
in countries like Brazil and India, often taking the form of development aid. Development 
workers from the Global North have seen as their role to “teach” development norms to 
recipients in the Global South (Finnemore, 1993; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). What is 
more, these practices seem to change very slowly in response to changes in global power 
distribution (McArthur & Werker 2016). This is a likely explanation to our finding that 
IOs occupy more central positions in the policy debates in Brazil and India. The finding 
that it is in these same countries where IOs face less resistance from national-level coali-
tions, in turn, is likely explained by the fact that global norms for emission reduction 
demand less from the lower income (non-Annex 1) countries. Even though the Paris 
Agreement does not contain a binding formulation of the CBDR principle like its prede-
cessor, the Kyoto Protocol (that defined the global norms in force during the period of 
our data collection), there are still more strategic advantages in aligning with IOs and 
global norms in Brazil and India. 
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 In addition, our results deviate from Alasuutari’s study (2016) in which he looked 
at the amount of references being made to IOs and international comparisons in parlia-
mentary debates in six different countries. He found out that IOs and international com-
parisons are markedly less present in US parliamentary debates than in any of the other 
six countries he studied, including Canada. However, Canada and the US look similar in 
their relation to global institutions and norms in our study on climate change policy de-
bates in the media while in Alasuutari’s study on parliamentary debates they look differ-
ent. This difference is likely explained by Alasuutari’s study not including climate policy 
which is a particularly globalized policy field, having mobilized domestic opposition in 
both Canada and the US, demonstrated by our analysis. 
 Second, the reflections above also suggest that our findings might be generalizable, 
at least to some extent, to differences between high-emitting high-income countries and 
low-emitting lower income countries beyond the four cases analyzed here. Further re-
search comparing a larger number of countries would be necessary to test whether this is 
indeed the case. Such research should also look into factors beyond the high emitter / low 
emitter divide that shape national climate change debates, including, for example, politi-
cal structures, structures of media institutions, relative dependence on fossil fuel indus-
tries and strength of civil society. Further research should also explore the role of IOs and 
the opposition or support they face in countries with high income levels but low emission 
levels. Further studies into the differences within the country groups, focusing on why 
certain topics become conflictual and others consensual, would also be welcome. 
 Because our data is cross sectional, we cannot establish whether there is a causal 
relationship between our two findings, the centrality of IOs and the lack of clustering in 
the discourse networks, and if so, what is the direction of causality. It may be that pre-
existing support for IOs shapes national debates on climate change, or that some charac-
teristics of pre-existing national debates creates opposition to IOs. A study using a longi-
tudinal data set would shed light on these questions. 
 Finally, it is worth emphasizing that our results are based on analyses of media 
representations of the policy debate. The media, as a public sphere, exerts power through 
gatekeeping as journalists often determine the framing and use of sources (Alasuutari et 
al., 2013), albeit in a context of institutional influences and constraints (Boykoff & Yuls-
man 2013). While it is reasonable to assume that the “mediated policy networks” 
(Stoddart et al. 2017a, p. 387) that we study here reflect policy networks in the political 
sphere to some extent, centrality in media debates does not automatically translate into 
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power in the political sphere (Stoddart et al. 2017a; Stoddart et al. 2017b). Studies that 
use other material than media coverage of the policy debates are thus also needed to fur-
ther support our suggestions on the role IOs in national policy debates. 
 
Acknowledgments 
This research was funded by the Kone Foundation (Grant Nos. 085319 and 088557), the 
Academy of Finland (Grant No. 1266685) and the US National Science Foundation 
(Grant No. BCS-0827006 and STS-0751258). The data collection and analysis for the 
Canadian case was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. 
 
References  
Alasuutari, P., 2016. The synchronization of national policies: ethnography of the global 
tribe of moderns. Routledge, New York. 
 
Alasuutari, P., Qadir, A., (Eds.), 2014. National policy-making: domestication of global 
trends. Routledge, London. 
 
Alasuutari, P., Qadir, A., Creutz, K., 2013. The domestication of foreign news: news sto-
ries related to the 2011 Egyptian revolution in British, Finnish and Pakistani newspapers. 
Media, Culture & Society 35 (6), 692–712. 
 
Boykoff, M., 2011. Who speaks for the climate? Making sense of media reporting on 
climate change. Cambridge University Press, New York. 
 
Boykoff, M., Yulsman, T. 2013. Political economy, media, and climate change: sinews 
of modern life. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 4 (5), pages 359–371. 
 
Broadbent, J., Sonnett, J., et al., (35 co-authors), 2016. Conflicting climate change 
frames in the global field of media discourse. Socius: Sociological Research for a Dy-
namic World 2, 1–13. 
 
Bulkeley, H., 2000. Discourse coalitions and the Australian climate change policy net-
work. Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space 18 (6), 727–748. 
  
21 
Dubash, N. K., 2009. Copenhagen: climate of mistrust. Economic and Political Weekly 
44 (52), 8–11.  
 
Dunlap, R., McCright, A., 2015. Countering climate change: the denial countermove-
ment. In Dunlap, R., Brulle, R., (Eds.), 2015. Climate change and society: sociological 
perspectives. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Farrell, J., 2015. Network structure and influence of the climate change counter-move-
ment. Nature Climate Change 6 (4), 370–374. 
 
Finnemore, M., 1993. International organizations as teachers of norms: the United Na-
tions educational, scientific, and cultural organization and science policy. International 
Organization 47 (4), 564–597. 
  
Finnemore, M., Sikkink, K., 1998. International norm dynamics and political 
change. International Organization 52 (4), 887–917. 
 
Fisher, D., Leifeld, P., Iwaki, Y., 2013. Mapping the ideological networks of American 
climate politics. Climatic Change 116, 523–545. 
 
Frank, D., Longhofer, W., Schofer, E., 2007. World society, NGOs and environmental 
policy reform in Asia. International Journal of Comparative Sociology 48 (4-5), 275–295. 
 
Hallding, K., Jürisoo, M., Carson, M., Atteridge, A., 2013. Rising powers: the evolving 
role of BASIC countries. Climate policy 13 (5), 608–631. 
 
Henry, A. D., Ingold, K., Nohrstedt, D., Weible, C., 2014. Policy change in comparative 
contexts: applying the advocacy coalition framework outside of Western Europe and 
North America. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 16 (4), 
299–312. 
 
Hironaka, A., 2014. Greening the globe. World society and environmental change. 
Cambridge University Press, New York. 
 
  
22 
Hochstetler K., Viola E., 2012. Brazil and the politics of climate change: beyond the 
global commons. Environmental Politics 21 (5), 753–771. 
 
Honkonen, T. 2009. The principle of common but differentiated responsibility in post-
2012 climate negotiations. Review of European, Comparative & International Environ-
mental Law 18 (3), 257–267. 
Ingold, K., Fischer, M., Cairney, P., 2016. Drivers for policy agreement in nascent sub-
systems: an application of the advocacy coalition framework to fracking policy in Swit-
zerland and the UK. Policy Studies Journal 45 (3), 442–463. 
 
Jenkins-Smith, H., Nohrstedt, D., Weible C., Sabatier P. 2014. The advocacy coalition 
framework: foundations, evolution, and ongoing research. In Sabatier, P., Weible C., 
(Eds.). Theories of the policy process. Westview Press, Boulder CO, 183–224. 
 
Kukkonen, A., Ylä-Anttila, T., Broadbent, J., 2017. Advocacy coalitions, beliefs and cli-
mate change policy in the United States. Public Administration 95 (3), 713–729. 
 
Lahsen, M., 2004. Transnational locals: Brazilian experiences of the climate regime. In 
Jasanoff, S., Long, M., (Eds.). Earthly politics: local and global in environmental govern-
ance. MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 151–172. 
 
Leifeld, P., 2010. Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA) manual. Available online at: 
http://www.philipleifeld.de/discourse-network-analyzer-dna/manual/. 
 
Leifeld, P., Haunss, S., 2012. Political discourse networks and the conflict over software 
patents in Europe. European Journal of Political Research 51 (3), 382–409. 
 
Leifeld, P., 2013. Reconceptualizing major policy change in the advocacy coalition 
framework: A discourse network analysis of German pension politics. Policy Studies 
Journal 41 (1), 169–198. 
 
Litfin, K., 2000. Advocacy coalitions along the domestic-foreign frontier: globalization 
and Canadian climate change policy. Policy Studies Journal 28, 236–252. 
  
23 
 
Lodge, M., Matus, K., 2014. Science, badgers, politics: advocacy coalitions and policy 
change in bovine tuberculosis policy in Britain. Policy Studies Journal 42 (3), 367–390. 
 
Longhofer, W., Schofer, E., 2010. National and global origins of environmental associa-
tion. American Sociological Review 75 (4), 505–533. 
 
MacDonald, D., 2008. Explaining the failure in Canadian climate policy. In Compston, 
H., Bailey, I., (Eds.). Turning down the heat: the politics of climate policy in affluent 
democracies. Palgrave, New York, 223–240. 
 
McArthur, J.W., Werker, E., 2016. Developing countries and international organizations: 
introduction to the special issue. The Review of International Organizations 11 (2), 155–
169. 
 
Meyer, J., Frank, D., Hironaka A., Schofer E., Tuma N., 1997. The structuring of a world 
environmental regime, 1870–1990. International Organization 51 (4), 623–51. 
 
McCright, A., Dunlap, R., 2003. Defeating Kyoto: the conservative movement’s impact 
on US climate policy. Social Problems 50 (3), 348–373. 
 
Painter, J., Ashe, T., 2012. Cross-national comparison of the presence of climate scepti-
cism in the print media in six countries, 2007–10. Environmental Research Letters 7 (4), 
044005. 
 
Purdon, M., 2015. Advancing comparative climate change politics: theory and method. 
Global Environmental Politics 15 (3), 1–26. 
 
Rabe, B.G., 2010. The aversion to direct cost imposition: selecting climate policy tools 
in the United States. Governance 23 (4), 583–608. 
 
Rennkamp, B., Haunss, S., Wongsac, K., Ortegad, A., Casamadrid, E., 2017. Competing 
coalitions: the politics of renewable energy and fossil fuels in Mexico, South Africa and 
Thailand. Energy Research & Social Science 34, 214–223. 
  
24 
 
Roberts, J.T., Parks, B.C., 2007. A climate of injustice: global inequality, north-south 
politics and climate policy. MIT Press, Cambridge MA. 
 
Roberts, JT., 2011. Multipolarity and the new world (dis)order: US hegemonic decline 
and the fragmentation of the global climate regime. Global Environmental Change 21 (3), 
776–784. 
 
Sabatier, P., Jenkins-Smith, H., 1988. An advocacy coalition model of policy change and 
the role of policy orientated learning therein. Policy Sciences 21 (2/3), 129–168. 
 
Schofer, E., Hironaka A., 2005. The effects of world society on environmental protection 
outcomes. Social Forces 84 (1), 25–47. 
 
Schäfer, M., Ivanova, A., Schmidt, A., 2014. What drives media attention for climate 
change? Explaining issue attention in Australian, German and Indian print media from 
1996 to 2010. The International Communication Gazette 76 (2), 152–176. 
 
Sewell, G., 2005. Actors, coalitions and the framework convention on climate change. 
Thesis (Ph. D.), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Urban Studies and Plan-
ning. 
 
Sodero, S., 2011. Policy in motion: reassembling carbon pricing policy development in 
the personal transport sector in British Columbia. Journal of Transport Geography 19 (6), 
1474–1481. 
 
Stoddart, M., Tindall, D., Smith, J., Haluza-Delay, R., 2017. Media access and political 
efficacy in the eco-politics of climate change: Canadian national news and mediated pol-
icy networks. Environmental Communication 11 (3), 386–400.  
 
 
Stoddart, M., Ylä-Anttila, T., Tindall, D., 2017. Media, politics, and climate change: the 
ASA task force report and beyond. Environmental Sociology. 
 
  
25 
Stoett, P., 2012. Global ecopolitics: crisis, governance and justice. University of Toronto 
Press, Toronto ON. 
 
Viola, E., 2013. Transformations in Brazilian deforestation and climate policy since 2005. 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 14, 109–123. 
 
Weible, C., 2005. Beliefs and perceived influence in a natural resource conflict: an ad-
vocacy coalition approach to policy networks. Political Research Quarterly 58 (3), 461–
475. 
Ylä-Anttila, T., Swarnakar, P., 2017. Crowding-in: how Indian civil society organiza-
tions began mobilizing around climate change. The British Journal of Sociology 68 (2), 
273–292. 
 
 
  
